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Abstract
The use of folktales and fables in explaining the physical and
spiritual worlds to children is cross-cultural, and precedes recorded
history. Prior studies indicate a developmental process in
children’s understanding of fables and folktales (Jose, D’Anna, &
Krieg, 2005; Narvaez, Gleason, Mitchell, & Bentley, 1999).
However, no known study has examined whether this
developmental process is cross-cultural or culture specific. No
known study also, has examined whether children as young as 6
years of age are aware that fables and folktales are non-historical.
The present study fills these observed gaps by examining moral
didacticism in children aged 6-11 years. The children were drawn
from two distinct nations and cultures (United States and Nigeria).
The study tested the children’s ability to: (a) recognize that
fables/folktales are not historical, and (b) deduce the moral lessons
in fables/folktales. They were asked to identify the correct answers
from a list of answer options. The older participants performed
better than the younger participants. Limitations and directions for
future studies are identified.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In every culture, people tell their children stories, and these
stories are often in the forms of folktales and fables. As noted by
Rupiper and Zeece (2005), folktales and fables constitute a
traditional literature that preceded recorded history. They are
intended to capture and explain the physical and spiritual worlds
that constitute questions to children. They answer the whys, whats,
and hows that characterize childhood. They answer questions such
as: why do people die? What happens to the human being after
death? Why do people commit moral transgressions? Why should
people behave well? The narration of fables and folktales
presupposes the receiver’s ability to extract a theme from the story.
It presupposes the receiver’s ability to understand the story’s moral
message. As rightly noted by Jose, D’Anna, and Krieg (2005), the
receiver of folktales and fables derives the point of the stories by
some inferential reasoning. Reasoning that is based on the outcome
for the characters in the story: because “A” resulted in positive
actions, then it is good to do “A”, and because “B” resulted in a
negative outcome, it is not good to do “B”. The question becomes:
are children able to do this kind of deductive reasoning? Do
children understand fables and folktales?
1

The 18th century German philosopher Jean-Jacques
Rousseau had argued that young children should not be taught
fables because they do not understand them. He believed that the
morals in them are so mixed and disproportionate to the age of
children that they often end in the opposite of the intended result –
vice, rather than virtue (Lewis, 2012)). What has changed? Fables
and folktales are still told to children, either in oral or written
forms. They are used for communication, construction of meaning,
and for the transmission of cultural values (Tharinger et al., 2008).
They are read to preschool children and constitute part of grade
school basal reader series (Jose, et al., 2005). Fables and folktales
are used as intervention technique in counseling and therapy with
children (Tharinger et al., 2008; Costantino, Malgady & Rogler,
1994; Fischer, 1984/1994; Gardner, 1993; Becker, Yehia,
Donatelli & Santiago, 2002). Folktales and fables are found in
most cultures, and some cultures place more emphasis on them
than others.
Do children understand fables and folktales? The fact that
the genre of folktales and fables has existed for millennia indicates
that it is not only the case that children understand them, but also
that they fulfill some important function as text structure. Prior
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studies observed a developmental process in children’s
understanding of fables and folktales (Jose et al., 2005; Narvaez,
Gleason, Mitchell, & Bentley, 1999). The present study advances
the studies by asking the following questions: are young children
aware that fables and folktales are non-historical? If there is a
developmental process in children’s understanding of fables and
folktales, is this developmental process cross-cultural? Does
culture matter in children’s development of moral didacticism. We
hypothesize that, (a) age is a factor in children’s moral didacticism,
(b) the effect of age is cross-cultural, and (c) culture matters. This
study will be a caution to users of fables and folktales in the
education and treatment of children.
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CHAPTER 2
Review of Literature
Development of Moral Reasoning
Understanding the developmental course of moral
reasoning will help us understand the use of folktales and fables in
communicating lessons. Humans unlike other mammals, need an
extended period of immaturity to prepare for adulthood. Other
mammals are able to care for themselves right after weaning.
Humans require 7-8 years to reach a marginal degree of
independence (Periss, Blasi, & Bjorklund, 2012). For children to
get to the adult level of adequacy in the understanding of mental
states, they have to go through certain rudimentary stages such as
joint attention, appreciation of intentionality, and the appreciation
that people can differ in perspectives (Kaysili & Acarlar, 2011;
Smetana, Jambon, Conry-Murray, & Sturge-Apple, 2012). Piaget
posited four stages of human cognitive development: Sensorimotor
stage, Preoperational stage, Concrete Operational stage, and the
Formal Operational stage. These different stages are different
modes of thinking, through which human beings transit from
infancy to adulthood. Each stage is characterized by qualitatively
different patterns of thinking (Cartwright, 2001). The implication
of these differences is that the manner in which folkways and
4

moral lessons are convened to children should change
developmentally.
In a commentary on Piaget’s stages of cognitive
development, Malerstein and Ahern (1979) noted that the
sensorimotor stage (birth to 24 months) is the period when the
child who has just evolved from an undifferentiated state with
some natural biological characteristics such as reflexes, comes to
recognize the outside world as different from himself, and begins
the initial use of symbols. In the early sensorimotor stage, the
infant is aware of only the things that are immediate to him: only
what he sees exist. About the ages of 7-9 months, the infant
develops object permanence; an object continues to exist though he
can no longer see it. In the Preoperational stage (2-7 years), the
child generally understands the essence of an object and no longer
confuses one object with another or a part with the whole. He is
able to think symbolically. In the Concrete Operational stage (8-11
years), the child develops a sense that the thoughts and feelings of
an individual are unique to him and may not be shared by those
around him. At this stage, the child is able to take the intentions of
a transgressor into consideration in the judgment of the severity of
transgressions. In the Formal Operational stage (adolescent to
adulthood), the individual is able to do abstract thinking. For
5

Piaget (1932/1965), moral judgment develops along a stage-like
developmental process, along the line of reasoning-based
cognition. For him, children younger than 7 or 8 years have a
“heteronomous thinking”. They believe that rules originate from
authorities, and rules are unchangeable. They also believe that the
consequence of an action determines the goodness or badness of
the action. According to Piaget, children develop an “autonomous
morality” after the age of 11 years. In this stage, they understand
that rules originate from social interactions and agreement, and
they are changeable. Children also come to see intention as more
important than consequence in actions.
Moran and O’Brien (1983) regarded as too simplistic,
Piaget’s conception that young children under the age of 7 or 8
years focus on consequence rather than intention in their judgment
of others. They argued that under certain circumstances such as
when the degree of property damage is held constant, children of
about 5 years of age use intention as a basis for their moral
judgment. According to them, consequence-based judgments are
used by children prior to age 4.5 years in cases concerning damage
to property, but in cases involving damage to another person, they
use intention-based judgments. For Kaysili & Acarlar (2011),
children might understand perceptions, desires, and emotions by
6

the age of 2 years. By the age of 3 years, they can distinguish
between mental and physical worlds, and might be able to
understand subjectivity of thoughts. By the age of 3 or 4 years,
they are able to separate thinking from doing. Nunner-Winkler and
Sodian (1988) believed that preschoolers are good at the attribution
of simple general purpose emotions such as happiness and sadness
to others, but are rarely able to refer to more complex emotions
such as shame, guilt or remorse in their everyday speeches.
According to them, children who are 4 years of age base their
judgment of actions on their successful outcomes. They expect the
wrongdoer to experience positive emotions. At the age of 8 years,
they focus their judgment on the moral value of an action and thus
attribute negative feelings to a wrongdoer. For Berk (2012),
children’s narratives increase in organization, detail, and
expressiveness as a result of improved memory. Children who are
4-5 years of age are able to narrate what happened, 6-7 year olds
can embellish their narratives with orienting information (such as
time and place) and connectives. By age 8-9 years, they are able to
make evaluative comments on narratives.
In sum, there is a consensus that cognition and moral
judgments follow a developmental continuum, though there
continues to be disagreement as to the nature of the developmental
7

changes in moral reasoning over time. In the present study, we
expect that age would be a factor in children’s moral didacticism.
We expect that, for the younger children (compared to older ones),
the emotional salience of a story (more than anything else) would
inform what moral judgment they make about a story, and what
moral message they take out of it.
Cultural Variation in the Use of Fables and Folktales
Every culture is endowed with rich literary resources. Such
literary resources include folktales and fables. Cross-cultural
characteristics of these tales include good overcoming evil, good
behavior rewarded and bad behavior punished, and justice
prevailing over evil. Today, folktales and fables in the framework
of storytelling has for the most part given way for written forms
(picture books), especially among the Western cultures. According
to a contemporary children’s book author Jennifer Armstrong
(2010), fables and folktales are written to share with children,
information about the natural world. They are intended to
encourage a sense of stewardship in children, and elicit
compassion, gentleness, wonder, and curiosity in them. They are
also intended to encourage children to identify with, and share in
the triumph of small, defenseless creatures. They provide children
with interesting and enriching literary experiences, broadening
8

their worldview. They “connect past generations with the present
and the present with future listeners and readers” (Rupiper &
Zeece, 2005).
By way of assessment feedback, fables and folktales are
used as treatment techniques in therapy and counseling with
children. As observed by Tharinger et al. (2008), because direct
feedback can be emotionally overwhelming for children,
discussing the results of psychological assessments directly with
them is a difficult and often unsuccessful task. Individualized
fables and folktales are used as veritable instruments for providing
indirect and successful assessment feedback to children. They can
reduce in children, the shame associated with assessment results,
thereby helping them to take-in the assessments without raising
their defenses or overtaxing their mental and emotional
capabilities. Fables and folktales can provide children with an
experience of accurate mirroring, and can become a transitional
object for the child to hold on to, and reread severally after the
feedback session.
Fables and folktales are used by the Igbos of Nigeria to
socialize their young ones. It is a veritable vehicle for imparting
moral standards and navigating culture, and they are traditionally
in the framework of storytelling. The “elders” who are the
9

custodians of the culture and are seen as the link between the
ancestors and the living have the responsibility of ensuring the
survival of the people’s culture. They “elders” are also the moral
guardians of the community. As one Igbo proverb puts it: “may
death spare at least one elder, that children may learn that vultures
are not edible”. Through folktales and fables, the “elders” hand
down the moral principles of the culture to the younger
generations. They attend to the varied fears that children encounter
in their troubled world through fables and folktales. Igbo folktales
and fables feature both animals and human beings. They are
humorous, making them entertaining and attractive to children.
The weak overcoming the strong, the bewilderment of foolishness,
and the trickery of cunning characters are featured in the fables and
folktales. These features attract children’s attention and arouse
their emotions (Jirata, 2011). Above all, fables and folktales are
moralistic. Major characteristics of Igbo fables and folktales
include, evil never overcoming good, virtue is rewarding and vice
is detrimental.
As noted by Ilias, Georgios, Marianthi, and Georgia (2010),
folklore and school, especially in Europe and America, were for
some time seen as opposed to each other, whereby folklore
represented the unofficial traditional culture, and school
10

represented the bureaucratic structures of the state. The educational
reforms that took place in Europe and America in the 19 th and 20th
centuries, however, changed the course of thinking. Folk
expressions began to be seen as a veritable educational tool, giving
fables and folktales a central position in folklorist and educationist
studies as they offer reference points for didactic purposes. Fables
and folktales form an important part of the cultural goods
addressed to children.
The moral point of a fable or folktale is deduced by
inferential reasoning. Therefore, moral judgment, moral emotions,
and theory of mind are some factors that influence children’s
ability to deduce moral lessons from them. Though fables and
folktales have nearly an age long history, writings on the topic are
very scanty in the field of psychology despite their contributions in
different fields of psychology (cognitive, developmental,
counseling and clinical psychology).
According to Narvaez et al. (1999), there was the
assumption that reading moral stories to children improves their
moral literacy. They set out to test this claim. Specifically, they
examined whether children can truly extract moral themes from a
story. They also investigated the developmental differences in
moral theme comprehension. To this end, they recruited 132
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participants from “city elementary school”: 50 third graders
averaging 8.5 years in age (28 girls and 22 boys), and 54 fifth
graders averaging 10.75 years in age (34 girls and 20 boys). They
tested the participants in two 50-minute sessions, one week apart.
The stories were put on audio tape as well as on paper for the
children. The older children received only the written version. The
tests were conducted in three groups according to grade. After
hearing and reading each story, the children were asked to think
about the message of the story. After a period of thinking,
participants answered 10 true or false questions about the story.
This was to assess their reading comprehension. For a vignette
rating, participants read four vignettes and were then asked to rate
each story according to how it matches the participant’s owntarget-message on a Likert-type scale. In their results, they
observed that reading moral stories to children does not guarantee
their grasp of the moral message or theme intended by the author.
They observed that stories were understood differently even among
grade school children. They also observed that there are
developmental differences in the comprehension of moral themes –
the younger children were less likely to choose the correct message
or vignette. Though for all ages, the most attractive distracter-type
for the vignettes was the one with the same actions as the target
12

story, this attraction decreased with age. Finally, they observed that
moral theme comprehension requires something more than general
reading comprehension. Even when standardized reading
comprehension and vocabulary scores were used as covariates
along with reading comprehension items, significant differences
between the third- and fifth-grade students on moral theme
comprehension tasks were still observed.
Jose et al. (2005) observed that fables occupy a prominent
position in the basal reader series of grade school children. They
therefore, set out to explore why children like fables and how they
comprehend the moral messages that fables convey. They sought
to identify whether the developmental patterns in fable moral
production and belief in a just world are related to each other over
the age range from children to young adults, and the
developmental patterns of the two phenomena. They hypothesized
that older children and adults would use the belief in a just world
in their moral evaluations of story outcomes and tested their
hypothesis with two experiments. For Study 1, they recruited 39
kindergartners, 37 first or second graders, 47 third or fourth
graders, and 48 fifth to eighth graders from two public schools in
the suburban Chicago area. The participants were predominantly
White and middle class. Boys and girls were about evenly
13

distributed, and 54 college students were also tested. The child
participants were given four stories in a random order: a human
just-world story, an animal just-world story, a normal fable and a
reversed-outcome fable. On the other hand, the adult participants
were given eight stories in a random order. The stories were read
by the experimenter to the kindergartners, the first and second
graders. The results supported their hypothesis: participants
showed just-world reasoning, and there were marked
developmental trends in the comprehension and appreciation of the
moral narratives. The older children saw canonical fables to have
fairer outcomes, liked the outcomes more, and liked the stories
more than the reversed-outcome fables. A developmental trend
was also observed for ratings of outcome liking in just-world
stories: the older children liked the outcomes in canonical justworld stories more than the outcomes in non-canonical just-world
stories.
For Study 2, Jose et al. (2005) recruited 40 kindergartners,
40 second graders, 40 fourth graders, and 40 sixth graders from
four Catholic schools in the Chicago area. The children were
predominantly Euro-Americans from middle class background.
The children were assessed individually in a quiet room. There
were three components of each assessment: (a) participants were
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read a series of three short moral stories and thereafter asked
questions from them; (b) they were asked to interpret a set of four
proverbs; and (c) they were asked the meaning of six metaphors.
Three stories (a normal fable, a reversed-outcome fable, and a justworld story) were randomly presented to each child participant. A
list of metaphors and proverbs were also read to the participants in
a fixed order. The results replicated Study 1: canonical fables were
judged to be fairer than outcomes of reversed-outcome fables, and
the canonical fables were also liked more than the reversedoutcome fables. As in Study 1, the older children made clearer
distinctions between the two types of story than the younger
children.
Jose et al. (2005) noted that young children’s understanding
of fable as a figurative literary structure is poor, just as it is in their
understanding of other types of metaphors. However, they
evidenced by their results that there is a developmental trend in
children’s acquisition of the just-world belief.
Ilias et al. (2010) acknowledged that folktales have a
central place in studies of folklorists and educationalists, and they
offer multiple reference points for didactic purposes. For them,
folktales are suitable for the learning process which regards pupils
as active and creative subjects, and not just simple receivers. They
15

believed that children understand and explain folktales according
to their age. They examined the complex relation of children with
the world of folktales, as a means of reshaping the known world.
To achieve their objective, Ilias et al. (2010) recruited 2283 pupils
from the 4th, 5th and 6th classes of elementary schools. They also
employed a diffusion of the research sample by combining urban
and rural areas. Of the participants, 85% declared Greece as their
place of birth, slightly more than 5% were born in Albania, and
2.5% were born in other countries, while about 7% did not declare
their country of birth. Ilias et al. (2010) expected that the
“diversion of the parent’s origin among children born and/or
studying in the same place” would make a difference regarding the
child’s view of folktales. Participants responded to questionnaires
that focused on folktales as texts and “oral storytelling as a
complex procedure”. Most of the questions were “closed” with the
possibility of a question having more than one answer. A fivepoint Likert-type scale was used (1 = very frequently and 5 =
never). Some questions were open with space for respondents to
write words, phrases, or sentences. In their results, they observed
that about 40% of the participants discerned the imaginary/mythic
element of folktales. On average, 7.5% of the participants stressed
the entertainment aspect of the folktales, 5% stressed the
16

educational/moral aspect, and 1% mentioned oral and traditional
character as the primary distinguishing aspect of folktales.
According to the results, younger pupils showed more fondness for
folktales, but as Ilias et al. (2010) noted, this “does not indicate
that folktales are themselves suited better in mental terms to
younger ages”.
Impact of Culture on the Development of Moral Reasoning
Does culture matter? Experiences influence people’s
worldview. Individuals who have lived through a dictatorial
government for example, are not likely to perceive or define
government in the same way as individuals who have only
experienced a healthy democratic system of government. Cultural
psychologists argue that because individuals living in different
cultural settings have different experiences, and because these
cultural perspectives provide new insights into the individuals’
psychological processes, culture matters (Oyserman and Lee,
2008; Piaget, 1972; & Cartwright, 2001). Individualism and
collectivism are not mere nomenclatures distinguishing cultural
groups; they articulate the basic differences in how cultural groups
perceive the relationship between the individual and society. While
the individual is the focus of action in an individualistic society,
the group is the core unit in a collectivistic society. The differences
17

between individualism and collectivism have effects on the
individuals involved: how they perceive the self, how they
conceive relationships with others, what is made salient in their
worldview, and how the individuals perceive themselves and the
social world.
Studies have shown that there are cross-cultural differences
in social knowledge and basic cognitive processes (Oyserman,
Sorensen, Reber, & Chen, 2009; Nisbett, 2003; Shahaeian,
Peterson, Slaughter, and Wellman, 2011). Oyserman et al., (2009)
noted that Americans are more accurate and faster than Chinese in
the recall of abstract and central information, whereas in matters of
details and wholeness, Chinese are more accurate than Americans.
Americans are more accurate in matters of absolute zero than
Japanese, whereas Japanese are more accurate in matters of
proportionality. Japanese are more accurate than Americans in
line-drawing tasks that require recall of lines in relation to a
provided background, whereas Americans are more accurate than
Japanese in the same task when it is separate from the background
(Oyserman, & Lee, 2008). These studies show that culture
influences cognition. So, culture matters.
Shahaeian et al., (2011) observed that when children
acquire theory of mind (ToM), they come to understand
18

individuals’ behavior as the product of their internal, subjective
mental state. They noted that, preschoolers with siblings in the
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia master
ToM of false belief earlier than children without sibling. Siblings
provide opportunities for interactions, family discussions, and
pretend play.
In sum, cultural differences exist in cognition. The present
study examines whether these differences extend to the
development of moral didacticism in children.
Research Questions
Jose et al. (2005) were interested in the developmental
trend in fable moral production and belief in a just world, seeking a
connection between the two phenomena. Narvaez et al. (1999)
examined whether children can deduce moral themes from stories
and the developmental differences in moral theme comprehension.
The present study furthers the discourse on children’s
understanding of fables and folktales by examining the following
questions: (a) are children as young as 6 years of age aware that
fables and folktales are non-historical? (b) If it is true that
children’s understanding of fables and folktales follows a
developmental process, is the process cross-cultural or culturespecific? In other words, does culture matter?
19

It is hypothesized that: (a) age is a factor in children’s
moral didacticism, such that, of the three age groups (6-7yrs, 89yrs, and 10-11yrs), the third group will fare best in the test and
the first group will be worst off, (b) the effect of age is crosscultural, and (c) culture matters. It is predicted that the children
from Nigeria (collectivistic society) will do better in the test of
moral didacticism than the children from the United States
(individualistic society).

20

CHAPTER 3
Method
Participants
This cross-cultural study was conducted in Nigeria and the
United States. Participants were selected from one Catholic school
in Owerri, Imo State of Nigeria, and one Catholic school in
Houston Texas, United States. Permission was obtained from the
school principals to visit the classrooms and make the activity part
of the regular classroom lessons. Being a part of classroom
lessons, parental consent was not required. Permission to conduct
the study was obtained from the Marshall University Institutional
Review Board (IRB).
From the United States (US) school, we recruited 20
children aged 6-7 years (Boys – 7, Girls – 13, M = 6.3, SD = 0.47),
20 children aged 8-9 years (Boys – 9, Girls – 11, M = 8.25, SD =
0.44), and 20 children aged 10-11 years (Boys – 7, Girls – 13, M =
10.15, SD = 0.37). All the students were African Americans and
from middle class families. From the Nigerian school, we recruited
20 children aged 6-7 years (Boys – 9, Girls – 11, M = 6.45, SD =
0.51), 20 children aged 8-9 years (Boys – 7, Girls – 13, M = 8.35,
SD = 0.49), and 20 children aged 10-11 years (Boys – 10, Girls –
10, M = 10.25, SD = 0.44). All the students were Nigerians and
21

from middle class families. The result is a 2 (Nigeria vs. US) X 3
(age groups) factorial design.
Procedure
The study was conducted in the children’s schools and in
their respective classrooms. To test the hypotheses, two stories
were read to the participants; the Tortoise and the Hare (see
Appendix A) and, the Tortoise and the Dog (see Appendix B). All
the students heard both stories. The stories and questions were
typed and duplicated. Each student got a copy of each of the
stories, with questions that followed (see Appendix C). The stories
were read to the students by their class teachers. At the end of each
story, participants were required to answer the questions that
followed. They were asked to circle the correct options.
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CHAPTER 4
Results
In each of the two schools, the study was conducted in the
students’ respective classrooms. Every member of the class was
allowed to take the test irrespective of age. At the end of the tests,
the results were separated according to age. Those who were not
within the age bracket of 6-11 years were rejected. Each
participant received points for the total number of questions
answered correctly. Only questions 8-11 were used in the test for
didacticism. If the question was answered correctly, a point was
awarded. Total number of questions answered correctly served as
the dependent variable. Therefore, the total score for any one
subject ranged from 0 to 4. A summary of the average scores are
presented in the table below.
Table 1
Average Number of Questions Answered Correctly by Nationality
and Age
______________________________________________________
Nationality
Ages 6 – 7yrs Ages 8 – 9yrs
Ages 10 – 11yrs

United States

M

SD

M

SD

M

0.55

0.94

1.20

1.24

1.60

SD_
1.60

Nigeria
1.00 1.03
1.95 1.15
2.30 1.42
______________________________________________________
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Results show that the youngest children (6-7yrs) overall,
answered fewer items correctly than either of the two older groups
(8-9yrs and 10-11yrs). To test the hypothesis that age affects moral
didacticism, a one-way ANOVA was conducted on subjects’
correct answer scores. Alpha level of .05 was used. True to our
first hypothesis, results showed that age has a significant effect on
children’s moral didacticism, F(5, 108) = 6.21, p < .0005. For our
second hypothesis, results indicated that nationality has a main
effect on children’s moral didacticism, F(1, 108) = 7.06, p < .01.
No significant interaction between age and nationality was
observed. Post hoc multiple comparisons were conducted using
Tukey Honest Significant Difference (Tukey HSD). Results
revealed that the youngest children (age 6yrs) were worst off in the
test. They performed significantly worse than children aged: 11
years (p < .0005), 10 years (p < .0005), and 9 years (p < .0005), but
not significantly different from children aged: 8 years (p = .084),
and 7 years (p = .114). The older groups (ages 7-11) did not differ
significantly from one another.
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CHAPTER 5
Discussion
The present study explores the developmental trend in
children's ability to deduce the moral lessons of fables and
folktales. Our results show an improvement in performance with
increasing age. This supports our first hypothesis that age is a
factor in moral didacticism. Children aged 6-7 years were the
worst off, and the children aged 10-11 years performed best. The
improvement in performance with increasing age is found among
students in both countries. It therefore, supports our second
hypothesis that the developmental process in children’s moral
didacticism is cross-cultural. Our third hypothesis – that culture
matters – was also supported by the results.
The results of this study have some implications for
society. We noted earlier that fables and folktales are used for
various purposes, such as communication, transmission of cultural
values, counseling and therapy with children. Our results indicate
that children understand and explain folktales according to their
age. This study therefore, brings caution to bear on the use of
fables and folktales in the education and treatment of children.
Though most of our subjects loved the stories, results show that
they did not understand the intended moral message. We are not
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saying that children cannot understand fables and folktales, and we
are not of the position that fables and folktales should not be used
with children. Our position is, caution should be applied when they
are used with children because they do not understand moral
stories like adults. There is a difference between liking a story and
understanding the story. Children’s differential interpretations of
fables and folktales should always be kept in mind.
Our hypothesis that culture matters in the moral didacticism
of children was supported by our results. However, the fact that
about 60% of the Nigerian subjects indicated that they were
hearing the story of the tortoise and the dog for the first time
throws caution. Jirata (2011) described how the people of Southern
Ethiopia (a collectivistic society) observed their night recreations.
At night time, he noted, when all family members have returned
from their daily workplaces, people from the same neighborhood
gather in one home where adults share what happened during the
day, and parents and grandparents tell folktales to children, while
the children admire and learn. The traditional Igbo society shared
this way of life some years ago, but that is hardly the case in most
areas today. As the communities get urbanized, they shift from
collectivism to individualism. Socio-demographic change has been
identified as a propeller of changes in cultural values (Greenfield,
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2009). Tönnies (1887/1957) introduced the concepts of
Gemeinschaft (communal society) and Gesellschaft (associational
society) to categorize social systems. The Gemeinschaft is
typically the rural, educational and technologically poor
environment, governed by traditional social norms. In contrast, the
Gesellschaft is the urban and large scale society, with government
bureaucracies. Greenfield (2009) identified the Gemeinschaft with
collectivistic qualities, and associated the Gesellschaft with
individualistic qualities. For him, when any of the variables of the
two prototypical environments (Gemeinschaft and Gesellchaft)
shifts either toward Gemeinschaft or Gesellschaft, developmental
pathways, learning environments and social values also shift
toward the same direction. In our study, results show a movement
toward Gesellschaft. Such a movement involves both the
environment and the individual. As a community becomes more
urban and commerce driven, it is not only the environment that is
transformed, the modes of socialization, learning and cultural
values are also transformed.
In the Gemeinschaft, there are such collectivistic values as
respect for parents and elders, and expectations that children will
take care of their aged parents. One of the difficulties of the
movement from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft is intergenerational
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conflict. Families having parents who grew up with Gemeinschaft
socialization, and children of the Gesellschaft socialization. This
intergenerational change often brings intergenerational conflict.
The results of this study therefore, is a wakeup call for the Igbo
society to prepare for this movement from Gemeinschaft to
Gesellchaft. This movement calls for adaptations on the parts of
both parents and children. Parents should prepare for an
environment where the “we” is replaced by the “I”, a society where
the nuclear family is isolated from the extended family, and a
society where the children might not be taking care of their parents
in old age. On the part of the children, they have to adapt to the
cross cutting socialization. They have to deal with socialization
messages from both the Gemeischaft environment (home) and the
Gesellschaft environment (school).
Limitations and Way Forward
Our subject were chosen from Catholic elementary schools
(private schools). Private schools are often not affordable for the
low socio-economic groups. Public elementary schools, however,
may consist of predominantly children of the low socio-economic
group. We suggest, future studies should take into consideration
socio-economic status.
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Pressed by the fact that 60% of our subjects in Nigeria
indicated that they have never heard the story of the tortoise and
the dog, we made further inquiries. Our inquiries revealed that a
good number of the students in our pilot school live in the school
hostel (did not live in their homes most of the times). The fact that
our study was carried out in a city, and in a school with children
who left home at a very early age, may have had an effect on our
results. Again, cities being melting pots of cultures may have had
an effect on our results. We recommend that future studies in
Nigeria should be conducted in rural traditional settings.
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Appendix A
The Tortoise and the Hare
Once upon a time there was a hare who, boasting how he
could run faster than anyone else, was forever teasing tortoise for
its slowness. Then one day, the irate tortoise answered back: “Who
do you think you are? There’s no denying you’re swift, but even
you can be beaten!” The hare squealed with laughter. “Beaten in a
race? By whom? Not you, surely! I bet there’s nobody in the world
that can win against me, I’m so speedy. Now, why don’t you try?”
Annoyed by such bragging, the tortoise accepted the challenge. A
course was planned, and the next day at dawn they stood at the
starting line. The hare yawned sleepily as the meek tortoise
trudged slowly off. When the hare saw how painfully slow his rival
was, he decided, half asleep on his feet, to have a quick nap. “Take
your time!” he said. “I’ll have forty winks and catch up with you in
a minute.”
The hare woke with a start from a fitful sleep and gazed
round, looking for the tortoise. But the creature was only a short
distance away, having barely covered a third of the course.
Breathing a sigh of relief, the hare decided he might as well have
breakfast too, and off he went to munch some cabbages he had
noticed in a nearby field. But the heavy meal and the hot sun made
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his eyelids droop. With a careless glance at the tortoise, now
halfway along the course, he decided to have another snooze
before flashing past the winning post. And smiling at the thought
of the look on the tortoise’s face when it saw the hare speed by, he
fell fast asleep and was soon snoring happily. The sun started to
sink, below the horizon, and the tortoise, who had been plodding
towards the winning post since morning, was scarcely a yard from
the finish. At that very point, the hare woke with a jolt. He could
see the tortoise a speck in the distance and away he dashed. He
leapt and bounded at a great rate, his tongue lolling, and gasping
for breath. Just a little more and he’d be first at the finish. But the
hare’s last leap was just too late, for the tortoise had beaten him to
the winning post. Poor hare! Tired and in disgrace, he slumped
down beside the tortoise who was silently smiling at him. “Slowly
does it every time!” he said (“childhoodreading.com,” 1997).
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Appendix B
The Tortoise and the Dog
After the creation of the world, God invited the dog and the
tortoise to send them into the world to proclaim either mortality or
immortality for humans. The dog carried the decree of immortality
while the tortoise carried that of mortality. Whichever of the two
animals that got into the world first was to promulgate its decree
and its decree would be the order. The two animals set out running
from heaven into the world, and the dog ran much faster than the
tortoise. The dog, however, would branch off from time to time to
scavenge for food, and each time it got distracted with scavenging
for food, the tortoise would meet it and pass it. When the dog is
done with scavenging, it would set out again, running fast and
would pass the tortoise, but only to branch off again at some other
point for food scavenging. Eventually, the tortoise got to the world
before the dog and decreed that humans would die.
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Appendix C
Thesis Questions
1.

I am a (a) boy

(b) girl

2.

I am (a) 6 (b) 7 (c) 8 (d) 9 (e) 10 (f) 11 years old

3.

I am in (a) 1st (b) 2nd (c) 3rd (d) 4th

4.

Do you like the story? (Yes/No)

5.

Does your family tell stories? (Yes/no)

6.

Have you heard the story before? (Yes/No)

7.

Was there a bird in the story? (Yes/No)

8.

Where did the story take place? (A: I do not know, B: it

(e) 5th (f) 6th grade

never happened, C: Texas, D: China).
9.

When did it happen? (A: I do not know, B: it never
happened, C: 1900, D: before I was born)

10.

What does the story teach us? (A: to run fast, B: not to eat
while working, C: to stay on track, D: to be respectful)

11.

What is the lesson of the story (A: hard-work, B: respect,
C: sincerity, D: stay on track)
Questions 1-6 deal with personal information. Question 7

tests the readiness of the subjects for the test. Students who failed
question 7 were judged not “ready for the test” and their entire
results were rejected. Only two of the tested students had their
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answers thrown out on the basis of question 7. The test of our
thesis was based on questions 8 – 11.
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